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A central debate in cognitive science concerns the nativist hypoth-
esis, the proposal that universal features of behavior reflect a
biologically determined cognitive substrate: For example, linguis-
tic nativism proposes a domain-specific faculty of language that
strongly constrains which languages can be learned. An evolu-
tionary stance appears to provide support for linguistic nativism,
because coordinated constraints on variation may facilitate com-
munication and therefore be adaptive. However, language, like
many other human behaviors, is underpinned by social learning
and cultural transmission alongside biological evolution. We set
out two models of these interactions, which show how culture can
facilitate rapid biological adaptation yet rule out strong nativiza-
tion. The amplifying effects of culture can allow weak cognitive
biases to have significant population-level consequences, radically
increasing the evolvability of weak, defeasible inductive biases;
however, the emergence of a strong cultural universal does not
imply, nor lead to, nor require, strong innate constraints. From
this we must conclude, on evolutionary grounds, that the strong
nativist hypothesis for language is false. More generally, because
such reciprocal interactions between cultural and biological evo-
lution are not limited to language, nativist explanations for many
behaviors should be reconsidered: Evolutionary reasoning shows
how we can have cognitively driven behavioral universals and yet
extreme plasticity at the level of the individual—if, and only if, we
account for the human capacity to transmit knowledge culturally.
Wherever culture is involved, weak cognitive biases rather than
strong innate constraints should be the default assumption.
nativism | evolution | culture | language
Acentral debate in cognitive science concerns the nativisthypothesis: the proposal that certain universal features of
human behavior can be explained by a biologically determined
cognitive substrate consisting of “reliably-developing conceptual
primitives, content-specialized inferential procedures, represen-
tational formats that impose contentful features on different
inputs, domain-specific skeletal principles” (ref. 1, p. 309). The
nativist hypothesis has been advanced for numerous psycholog-
ical phenomena, such as concepts (2), folk psychology (3), music
perception (4), and religious belief (5).
Perhaps the most widely known example of nativist reasoning
comes from Chomsky’s work on language: Linguistic nativism
proposes a domain-specific faculty of language that strongly
constrains which languages can be learned (6). Linguistic nativ-
ism is sometimes taken as the most successful example of nativist
reasoning (1), and proof that nativist explanations are necessarily
true in at least some domains.
The presence of innate domain-specific constraints on cogni-
tion would clearly require an explanation. Such constraints have
been persuasively argued to be likely products of natural selec-
tion (7). Specifically dealing with constraints on language
learning, Pinker and Bloom argue that coordinated constraints
on variation may facilitate communication and therefore be
adaptive: “the requirement for standardization of communica-
tion protocols dictates that . . .many grammatical principles and
constraints must accordingly be hardwired into the [language
acquisition] device” (ref. 7, p. 720). This leads naturally to what
we will call strong linguistic nativism: an account proposing that
there are features of our biologically inherited cognitive ma-
chinery that provide hard constraints on what behaviors can be
acquired, and that these constraints are domain-specific in the
sense that they have evolved via biological evolution under
pressure for enhanced communication; in other words, they have
evolved for language.
Recent work has questioned the nativist position, either by
reassessing the challenges facing language learners (8) or by
questioning the evidence for certain types of language universals
(9). Here we focus instead on the evolutionary reasoning behind
strong nativism. Language, like many other human behaviors, is
underpinned by social learning and cultural transmission along-
side biological evolution (10, 11): Learners acquire the language
of their speech community via a process of learning from obser-
vations of the linguistic behavior of that community. Consequently,
language is a product of at least two evolutionary processes—
biological evolution of the language faculty, and cultural evolution
of languages.
In this paper, we test the evolutionary plausibility of strong
nativism, by setting out a general model of the interactions be-
tween biological and cultural evolution. Two instantiations of
this model show that culture can facilitate rapid biological ad-
aptation of the language faculty yet does not deliver hard con-
straints on learning. Even when strong universal tendencies in
behavior emerge, there are few circumstances where strong do-
main-specific innate constraints on cognition evolve, but many in
which culture bootstraps the rapid fixation of weak, defeasible
inductive biases.
Evolutionary Perspectives on Linguistic Nativism
How should we expect biology and culture to interact to shape
language and the language faculty? One possibility is that the
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rate of language change far exceeds that of biological evolution,
preventing genetic assimilation of linguistic features into the
language faculty (12): the “moving target” argument. Chater
et al. (12) demonstrate this point convincingly in a series of
simulation models showing that biological evolution cannot en-
code innate constraints for linguistic features that change rapidly
as a result of external factors (e.g., language contact). However,
some aspects of language exhibit stable statistical regularities, or
“language universals”: These are at the center of nativist rea-
soning and commonly thought to be held stable by constraints on
learning (13). Chater et al. also simulate this scenario, finding
that, when language is influenced more by the innate constraints
of learners than by external factors (a possibility they consider
implausible but which might be assumed under the nativist hy-
pothesis), strong constraints on learning do evolve. This work
highlights the necessity of understanding how genetic and cul-
tural processes interact to shape language: The plausibility of
strong linguistic nativism is contingent on the relationship be-
tween individual-level biases and population-level languages.
Another approach to the evolution of constraints on learning
is provided by ref. 14, who consider the evolution of constraints
on the size of the set of languages considered by learners. They
provide two general results. Firstly, there is selection in favor of a
language faculty that reduces the size of the search space to
levels that allow a population to converge on a shared grammar,
as predicted by ref. 7. However, selection will not lead to the
most constrained possible learner, because there are costs to
being overly constrained (i.e., inability to acquire one of several
languages at use in the population). This balance of selective
pressures yields learners whose language faculty is permissive,
allowing them to learn the largest possible set of languages, but
which is nonetheless constraining enough to permit convergence
within a population.
Both of these models present important limits on strong na-
tivism. However, both models only consider the evolution of
strong constraints on learning: innate mechanisms that effec-
tively dictate whether or not a particular grammar can be ac-
quired. This restriction to “nativism or nothing” rules out a
broad class of possible forms of innateness. Many aspects of
human cognition (15), and language acquisition in particular
(16), may be better characterized by soft constraints: probabi-
listic inductive biases that can impose a continuum of prefer-
ences ranging from weak to strong. Probabilistic inductive biases
in acquisition have been proposed to account for universals
concerning word order generalizations (13) and hierarchical
phrase structure (17) in syntax, suffixing and prefixing asymme-
tries in morphosyntax (18), and patterns of vowel harmony (19)
and velar palatalization (20) in phonology.
A well-known property of cultural evolution is that, under a
wide range of circumstances, weak inductive biases acting on
learning can have strong effects in the cultural system as the
effects of those biases accumulate (10, 21, 22): Given enough
time, a weak bias in favor of a particular trait can eventually
drive that trait to fixation. Probabilistic constraints combined
with culture therefore potentially provide an alternative to na-
tivism or nothing: Behavioral universals can be underpinned by
weak biases at the level of the individual.
Here we present two models that allow us to study the bi-
ological evolution of a capacity for learning a culturally trans-
mitted behavior. These models combine learning, culture, and
evolution in a general way and allow us to look for conditions
under which strong nativism might be evolutionarily plausible.
We focus on the case where language change is influenced solely
by learning, and not by external factors, because it is here that
linguistic nativism has received support from evolutionary rea-
soning, and construct our models around a well-understood,
general model of cognition: Bayesian inference. Bayesian models
of cognition allow us to explicitly model the influence of innate
inductive biases (of various strengths) and environmental input
on inference (23, 24), while generalizing over the particular
psychological mechanisms that could implement inductive bias.
Contemporary approaches to linguistic nativism have cast the
debate directly in terms of inductive biases (25, 26), and several
core topics of linguistic nativism have been addressed with
Bayesian cognitive models.
Our models are maximally abstract: Language learning is re-
duced to acquisition of a single linguistic feature. Acquisition of
natural languages involves learning about many statistically
intertwined linguistic features simultaneously; however, this sim-
plification allows us to derive general evolutionary results that
relate inductive biases to linguistic structures.
Model 1
In Model 1, we assume a language can be described by a set of
discrete absolute principles and potentially variable parameters
(27). This perspective has a long pedigree in linguistics, has been
described as “the bona fide theory of innateness” (ref. 28, p. 451),
and enjoys wide support as a model for nativism, in the broad
sense that it posits universal principles and narrowly restricted
options for cross-linguistic variation (28–30).
Model Details. Let F be a linguistic feature that can vary in a bi-
nary manner across languages (e.g., F could represent harmony
in the ordering of heads and complements across phrasal types).
Then, a (potentially infinite) space of possible languages is
carved into two possible types, T0 and T1, based on whether they
obey the feature or not (e.g., T1 languages exhibit harmonic or-
dering across phrase types, whereas T0 languages do not). There
are two corresponding classes of utterance, U0 and U1, which are
produced by speakers and portray whether the underlying lan-
guage is of type T0 or T1, according to the following likelihood
function, where e gives the probability of noise on production,
PrðUxjTxÞ= 1− e, Pr

Uy≠x
Tx= e, [1]
for x, y= 0,1. Bayesian learners assess a particular hypothesis h by
combining the likelihood of observed dataset d in light of that
hypothesis, PrðdjhÞ, with the prior probability of the hypothesis
independent of the data observed, PrðhÞ, to obtain a posterior
probability of that hypothesis: PrðhjdÞ∝PrðdjhÞPrðhÞ. Here, we
interpret the set of hypotheses as the set of possible grammars
or language types, so that h∈ fT0,T1g. Data d= fd1, . . . , dNg are
sets of utterances from which learners must learn a language:
The likelihood of a dataset is simply the product of the likeli-
hood of the individual utterances PrðdjhÞ=QNk=1PrðdkjhÞ, with
dk ∈ fU0,U1g for k= 1, . . . ,N. The prior probability distribution
over grammars reflects the innate biases of learners, and simply
assigns probabilities to the two language types: Prðh=T0Þ= 1− α,
Prðh=T1Þ= α. Extreme values of α (α≈ 0 or α≈ 1) would corre-
spond to a principle in standard terminology: a strong or abso-
lute constraint on the type of language that can be acquired
by learners, ruling out one type of language; α≈ 0.5 would
correspond to an unconstrained learner who can learn either
language type.
To model cultural transmission, we use “iterated learning”
(21, 22): The data that a learner is exposed to are produced by
another individual who learned in the same way. In other words,
once the learner has settled on a particular hypothesis, they will
produce utterances in line with that hypothesis, from which others
can learn.
Finally, we model biological evolution by specifying a set of
genes that collectively determine the prior bias of a learner, and
which are inherited by new learners, subject to mutation. We
treat the prior as a “polygenic” trait (31): The genome of a
learner is a set of n genes whose alleles each encode small effects
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in favor of one language type or the other; the prior probability
of a particular hypothesis is simply the proportion of genes that
have the allele promoting that hypothesis. If a learner’s genetic
endowment includes exactly i genes favoring languages of type T1
(and n− i favor type T0), then αi = i=n. Genetic transmission is
under selection: In line with other models (14, 32), we assume
individuals reproduce with a probability directly proportional
to their ability to communicate with the rest of the population;
individuals who have the same language type are deemed to
communicate successfully. Let gi be the proportion of the
population at generation t made up by learners with prior αi,
and let ai be the probability that a learner with this prior will
acquire a language of type T1. The fitness of a learner with prior
αi is given by
fi = aic+ ð1− aiÞð1− cÞ, [2]
where c is the population frequency of language type T1.
Without cultural transmission, the outcome of language ac-
quisition is determined entirely by the learner’s prior prefer-
ences, so ai = αi. However, when cultural transmission is included
in the model, the outcome of language acquisition also depends
upon the linguistic data a learner encounters, which in turn de-
pend upon the distribution of language types at the previous
generation, cðt−1Þ (see Methods for details of how ai is calculated
in the cultural models). We assume initially that learners acquire
their language type by observing utterances produced by a single,
randomly chosen individual in the previous generation, and, in
Supporting Information, describe a version of our model that
relaxes this assumption. We analyze two versions of the cul-
tural model, by contrasting two varieties of Bayesian learner
that are known to lead to different cultural evolutionary dy-
namics (21): “MAP learners” weigh up the posterior proba-
bility of both language types and select the winner [i.e., the
hypothesis with the highest posterior probability—the maxi-
mum a posteriori (MAP) estimate]; “sample learners” pick a
language according to its posterior probability. Given the model
we have described, the dynamics of biological evolution in the
population is given by
gðt+1Þi =
1
ϕ
Xn
j=0
gj   fj   mi,j for  j= 0,1, . . . , n [3]
where mi,j is the probability that the offspring of a learner with
prior αj will, through mutation (see Methods), inherit αi, and
ϕ=
Pn
i=0 gifi is the average fitness of the population.
Results. The initial state of each simulation is an unbiased pop-
ulation of learners (i.e., whose genes encode α= 0.5). A result
favoring the strong nativist hypothesis would be one in which
natural selection for linguistic coordination leads to the final
population’s prior bias consisting of extreme values, α≈ 0 or
α≈ 1, effectively ruling out one language type.
Fig. 1 shows results of numerical and agent-based simulations
of these processes. In the baseline model (Fig. 1A) without
cultural transmission (comparable to innate signaling in non-
cultural organisms), after a few thousand generations of gradual
change, biological evolution eventually leads to the emergence of
strong innate biases for a single language type, which maximizes
the communicative utility of that language.
We see a radically different pattern of results when we add
cultural transmission to the model. In cultural populations of
MAP learners, one language type rapidly comes to dominate the
population: Convergence in cultural populations occurs an order
of magnitude faster than in acultural populations. However, this
strong cultural preference is not directly reflected in the pop-
ulation’s genes. Instead, learners have a very weak bias favoring
the majority language type, and could easily acquire the un-
attested language type given appropriate data. The emergence of
a strong cultural universal thus does not imply, nor lead to, nor
require, a strong innate constraint. In contrast, under cultural
transmission in sampling populations, neither strong innate
constraints nor strong language universals emerge. When we
A B C D
Fig. 1. Results for the evolutionary model. (A) Results of a numerical model of an infinitely large population, where there is no cultural transmission of
language: Individuals select a language with probability given by their genes (i.e., α). (Upper) The evolution of the population’s mean innate bias, α (solid
line), which directly determines the proportion of individuals using languages of type T1 (c, dashed line). (Lower) The distribution of α in the population after
the model has converged, demonstrating a strong bias in favor of one language type. (B) Results from the model where language is culturally transmitted and
in which learners pick the MAP hypothesis (again, solid line shows mean α, and dashed line shows c). (C) The same plots for learners who sample a hypothesis
from the posterior distribution. Results of the numerical model give the equilibrium distribution of biases and languages, which reflect the stable outcome of
evolution given these conditions. (D) Results from 300 agent-based simulations, giving the values of α and c (the same variables plotted in A−C, Upper) after
10,000 generations in acultural populations (green), and in 1,000 generations in cultural populations of MAP (blue) and sample (red) learners. Results
supporting strong universals (c≈ 0 or 1) underpinned by strong nativism (α≈ 0 or 1) would appear in the top left or bottom right corners of this graph but
never occur when culture is included in the model; instead, we see strong universals underpinned by weak biases (in MAP populations) or no universals and no
constraints on learning (in sampling populations); n= 100,   e= 0.01,   μ= 0.001,   N= 2.
Thompson et al. PNAS Early Edition | 3 of 6
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include cultural transmission in the model, under no conditions
do we see the evolution of strong universals underpinned by
strong innate constraints.
Why is this happening? Weak biases in (MAP) individuals are
amplified by cultural transmission, driving large effects at the
population level (10, 21, 22). In our initial populations, every
individual communicates equally well (or poorly): Reproduction
occurs at random. Drift of the genes ensues, moving the pop-
ulation away from the perfect α= 0.5 equilibrium (in the nu-
merical analysis, we must specify a minor asymmetry in the initial
linguistic distribution c0 = 0.55 to mimic this stochastic drift pro-
cess). At this point, cultural transmission unmasks the tiny biases
of individuals, resulting in large effects on the population’s cul-
ture: A linguistic universal begins to emerge. Natural selection
then favors nonneutrality in the direction of the emerging uni-
versal. However, cultural evolution can also mask relative
strength of bias (21, 22): Both weak and strong biases can drive
strong universals and reliable acquisition of the dominant lan-
guage; consequently, there is no selection in favor of stronger
biases. The combination of unmasking and masking by cultural
evolution leads to a balance of forces: Mutation pressure in-
herent in the genetic model causes drift toward neutrality in the
prior, but natural selection keeps individuals away from perfect
neutrality. As a result, MAP populations settle on the weakest
possible biases that nevertheless ensure convergence on a single
language type, leading to universals.
Sampling does not lead to the amplifying effect normally as-
sociated with cultural evolution; rather, the culture of sample
learners tracks their biases (21). Weak biases provided by drift
are never unmasked: There is no consistent selective pressure for
a particular bias that would result from a cultural universal
generated by unmasking. Neither strong innate constraints nor
strong universals emerge: Genes and culture drift, in lockstep,
toward a distribution determined by mutation.
Supporting Information presents a range of variations on this
model, testing alternative basic assumptions about learning, cul-
ture, and biology. We test cases where learners learn from multiple
teachers, where genomes vary continuously, where one language is
functionally superior, and where both MAP and sample learners
exist in the population. In the latter case, as predicted in ref. 33,
MAP learners outcompete sample learners, suggesting the pattern
of results for MAP learners is the more robust prediction. In none
of these variants does evolution lead to nativization (Figs. S1–S5).
Model 2
Model 1 assumes learners acquire a discrete linguistic feature
by choosing between just two hypotheses. This discreteness ab-
stracts away from the continuous variation often thought to be
characteristic of human learning. To address this limitation, we
reformulate the model to reflect an alternative view of linguistic
knowledge: Language acquisition reflects statistical inference
over probabilistic relationships between grammatical categories.
Model Details. Let L be a simple stochastic grammar that specifies
constraints on the possible orderings of grammatical categories
X and Y. During acquisition, the learner infers a probabilistic
generalization about the ordering of these categories: We could
interpret this model of acquisition as applying to proposed uni-
versals concerning suffixing and prefixing, or the ordering of
verbs and their objects, for example.
Let p be the probability of ordering S→X  Y, such that
PrðS→X  YjLÞ= p, and PrðS→Y  XjLÞ= 1− p. The learner must
make inferences about the underlying probabilities of the two
ordering patterns by inducing an estimate p^: The set of hypoth-
eses a learner considers is infinitely fine-grained, with the learner
entertaining all values of p in the range ½0,1. We consider a
noncultural model and the two types of Bayesian learner as be-
fore. Methods details the model of Bayesian inference we adopt,
and describes a flexible scheme for specifying a prior distribution
over this hypothesis space based on the learner’s genes. For direct
comparison with Model 1, we explore the case where the expected
value of the prior over p reflects the proportion of the learner’s
genes promoting ordering XY. Formally, αi =E½PrðpjiÞ≈ i=n.
Again, fitness reflects the ability to communicate by coordinating
on an ordering of X and Y.
Results. Evolution in Model 2 (Fig. 2) reproduces the key results
seen in Model 1. In acultural populations, evolution leads to
fixation of strong inductive biases favoring one particular fixed
ordering for X and Y. Including culture in the model radically
changes the outcome of evolution. In populations of MAP
learners, we observe rapid fixation of weak inductive biases that
drive a strong cultural universal. In populations of sample
learners, again, evolution leads nowhere: no fixation of domain-
specific inductive biases and no cultural universals. Again, results
hold under a broad parameter range, being particularly robust in
MAP populations (see Supporting Information for testing).
A B C D
Fig. 2. Evolution in model 2. (A−C) Equilibrium distribution of priors α (Lower) and timecourse dynamics (Upper) for the mean of the population’s prior
(α, solid lines) and expected use of ordering S→X  Y (p, dashed lines), in acultural (A), and cultural (B, MAP learners; C, sample learners) populations. (D) Results
of 300 agent-based simulations of the model (100 acultural, 100 MAP, 100 Sample) in populations of 100 learners after 1,000 generations: Points show the
mean of the population’s prior (α) and expected use of ordering S→X  Y (p) in the final population;n= 100,   μ= 0.001,   N= 20,   λ= 20.
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Discussion
These models show that cultural transmission radically changes
the evolution of constraints on learning, rendering strong lin-
guistic nativism untenable on evolutionary grounds. On the one
hand, unmasking facilitates rapid evolution of domain-specific
biases: Due to culture, the population-level consequences of
those biases are amplified and visible to selection. However,
masking makes evolving strong constraints unlikely: Given that
weak constraints have equivalent effects to strong constraints,
there is little or no selection for stronger constraints (34). Note
that we do not rule out strong innate constraints on language
learning that are domain-general, i.e., have not evolved for the
purpose of constraining learning to facilitate communication.
For example, we might expect strong evolved constraints that are
truly domain-independent [e.g., constraints on statistical learning
mechanisms (8) or principles of efficient computation (35) that
apply to language and other systems], or which are a conse-
quence of architectural constraints that are a byproduct of our
evolutionary history [e.g., spandrels, or developmental con-
straints (35)]. We may also expect adaptations in the peripheral
machinery for language (e.g., vocal anatomy and associated
neural machinery), which may follow different evolutionary dy-
namics (36).
Weak biases are defeasible: The cultural environment can
easily overrule these dispositions. This removes any apparent
paradox in the idea that we can have biologically driven behav-
ioral universals but nevertheless extreme plasticity at the level of
the individual [see, e.g., work demonstrating that the visual
cortex can be recruited for language processing in congenitally
blind adults (37)]. Under an account assuming that behavioral
universals can only be explained in terms of strong innate con-
straints, such individual-level plasticity is puzzling; however,
under an account where cultural evolution mediates between the
biases of individuals and behavioral universals, such plasticity is,
in fact, predicted.
Weak constraints are also highly evolvable: Evidence for re-
cent rapid adaptation in humans (38) may reflect rapid fixation
of weak biases rather than the construction of strongly con-
straining domain-specific cognitive modules. Our models predict
an increase in the rate and number of cognitive adaptations with
the onset of culture in human evolution (11) and that the genetic
underpinnings of these adaptations may be difficult to detect.
Conclusions
Culture mediates between the biases of individual learners and
population-level tendencies or universals. This radically changes
the predictions we should make about the language faculty, or
any other system of constrained cultural learning: Specifically,
the evolution of strong domain-specific constraints on learning is
ruled out. Rather, the behavioral universals that these con-
straints are invoked to explain can instead be produced by weak
biases, amplified by cultural transmission. Although we have
framed our model in terms of language and linguistic nativism,
the same account may be applicable to any behavior that is the
product of interactions between culture and biology: Wherever
cognition has been shaped to acquire culturally transmitted be-
haviors, our arguments should apply. We anticipate that cultural
transmission may be amplifying the effects of learning biases in
many domains of human behavior, mimicking the effects of
strong innate constraints and inviting nativist overinterpretation;
identifying these domains is a key priority. The default expla-
nation of shared, universal aspects of language or other cultural
behaviors should be in terms of weak innate constraints.
Methods
Model 1. To calculate acquisition probabilities in the model with cultural
transmission, wemust account for the range of possible datasets d each learner
could encounter and the inferences she would make in each case, so that
ai =
X
d
Pr

d
cðt−1ÞPrinduceðT1jd, αiÞ. [4]
Assuming a single teacher is randomly sampled from the previous generation,
the probability of learning from a speaker of T1 is cðt−1Þ [and of T0 is 1− cðt−1Þ],
so the likelihood, Prðdjcðt−1ÞÞ, of observing dataset d is
Pr

d
cðt−1Þ= cðt−1ÞPrðdjT1Þ+1− cðt−1ÞPrðdjT0Þ. [5]
Induction probabilities for sample learners follow posterior probabilities
directly, so PrinduceðT1jd,αiÞ= PrðT1jd, αiÞ. For MAP learners, these are
PrinduceðT1jd, αiÞ=
8<
:
1, if  PrðT1jd, αiÞ> PrðT0jd, αiÞ
0.5, if  PrðT1jd, αiÞ= PrðT0jd, αiÞ
0, otherwise.
[6]
During reproduction, each of a learner’s n genes may mutate with in-
dependent probability μ into a gene of the opposite type. Because there
are

n
i

possible genomes with i genes favoring T1, it is nontrivial to
calculate the mutation probabilities between priors. However, it can be
shown that
mi,j =
Xn−i
k=0

n− i
j− i+ k

i
k

μj−i+2kð1− μÞn−j−i+2k . [7]
We obtain the equilibrium distribution of biases g* and language types
c* by specifying initial distributions g0 and c0, and iterating the recursion
Eq. 3 to find the resulting numerical solutions g*, c* that satisfy
g=g*, c= c*⇔g=gðt+1Þ, c= cðt+1Þ, where g= ðg0,g1, . . . ,gnÞ is a probability
vector for the gi s, and superscripts index time points. In all numerical
analyses of both models, g0i ∝

n
i

for i= 0, . . . ,n.
Model 2. The learner’s prior over p follows a Beta distribution with param-
eters β1 and β0,
Pr

p
β1, β0=Betap; β1, β0=pβ1−1ð1−pÞβ0−1
B

β1, β0
 . [8]
The data a learner observes consists of N independent utterances that ex-
emplify an ordering pattern for X and Y, of which some number y ∈ 0, . . . ,N
exemplify the specific ordering S→XY. The likelihood for yjN,p is the bi-
nomial distribution
Pr

y
p^j=Binomialðy;N,pÞ=

N
y

pyð1−pÞN−y. [9]
The posterior for p given y is also a Beta distribution,
Pr

p
y, β1, β0=Betap; β1 + y, β0 +N− y. [10]
Let p= ðp^0, p^1, . . . , p^nÞ give the expected outcome of language acquisition
for each class of learner at generation t: p^i is the expected outcome for a
learner with i genes promoting ordering XY. Without culture, p^i reflects
the expected value when sampling randomly from the prior, given by the
prior mean,
p^i = αi = E
h
Pr

p
β1i , β0i i= β1iβ1i + β0i . [11]
With culture, p^i is conditional on the data a learner sees. Summarizing the
possible datasets by the possible counts y (which are sufficient statistics),
then, in the sample learner model,
p^ðt+1Þi =
Xn
j=0
gj
XN
y=0
Pr

y
p^jEhPrpy, β1i , β0i i, [12]
where the outcome of acquisition given y reflects the expected value when
sampling from the posterior, the posterior mean,
E
h
Pr

p
y, β1i , β0i i= β1i + yβ1i + β0i +N. [13]
Likewise, in the MAP learner model,
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p^ðt+1Þi =
Xn
j=0
gj
XN
y=0
Pr

y
p^jargmaxp Pr

p
y, β1i , β0i , [14]
where the outcome of acquisition reflects themaximumaposteriori estimate,
or the posterior mode, which is known to be
argmax
p
Pr

p
y, β1i , β0i = β1i + y − 1β1i + β0i +N−2. [15]
Fitness can be computed, at the mean field level, with
fiðpÞ= bpip+1− bpið1−pÞ, [16]
where p=p ·g is the overall expected value for p in the population. Thus, the
recursion for biological dynamics becomes
gðt+1Þi =
1
ϕ
Xn
j=0
gjfjðpÞmj,i . [17]
Finally, we must specify the relationship between genes and prior parame-
ters, β1 and β0. Let β1 and β0 reflect the ratio of gene types in the genome,
smoothed by a constant λ,
β1i =
i+ λ
n− i+ λ
, β0i =
n− i+ λ
i+ λ
. [18]
The uniform prior (β1i = β
0
i = 1) is given by a uniform distribution of gene types as
in Model 1, because ði+ λÞ=ðn− i+ λÞ= ðn− i+ λÞ=ði+ λÞ= 1⇔ i=n− i=n=2. The
parameter λ≥ 0 controls the relationship between asymmetry in the gene
distribution and the shape of the prior distribution over p. See Supporting
Information for details and analysis (Figs. S6–S8). Here we set λ= 20, which for
our n= 100 example ensures the approximately linear relationship between
the balance of genes in the genome and the prior.
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